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The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation
Act: Potential Problems in the Biologic-Drug
Regulatory Scheme
By Ryan Timmis *
In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, often referred
to as “Obamacare.” Though little noticed in the fanfare surrounding this event, Title VII,
the Biologic Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), was arguably one of the most
important provisions. The BPCIA represents one of the more significant overhauls to the
pharmaceutical industry in recent decades. For the first time, federal law established a
pathway for the creation of generic versions of drugs produced by biotechnological means.
Congress hoped by legalizing the production of generic biological drugs, generally known
as “biosimilars,” that consumer prices for a variety of important drugs would decrease.
In 1983, the Hatch-Waxman Act created a pathway to market for generic versions of
traditional small-molecule drugs. Small-molecule drugs, which comprise the majority of
commonly used drugs, are created by purely chemical processes and have relatively simple
structures. As Congress hoped, Hatch-Waxman has had considerable success in lessening
the cost of many pharmaceuticals. For instance, a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) study
found that the entry of multiple generics into the market under the Hatch-Waxman Act
reduced the price of some drugs by up to 80%.
But consumers are unlikely to see comparable biosimilar price reductions resulting from
the BPCIA’s enactment. First, biologic drugs are inherently more difficult and costly to
manufacture than traditional pharmaceuticals, providing barriers to entry that the BPCIA
cannot effectively address. Second, compared to Hatch-Waxman, the BPCIA imposes much
longer exclusivity periods for both reference drugs and the first biosimilar produced. This
will, at a minimum, delay the cost benefits stemming from increased competition. Lastly,
the interchangeability provisions, which allow for automatic substitution of reference
products similar to generic chemical drugs under Hatch-Waxman, are much stricter for
biologics regulated under the BPCIA.
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¶1

¶2

INTRODUCTION

In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, often
referred to as “Obamacare.” 1 Though little noticed in the fanfare surrounding this event,
Title VII, the Biologic Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), was arguably one
of the most important provisions. 2 The BPCIA represents one of the more significant
overhauls to the pharmaceutical industry in recent decades. For the first time, federal law
established a pathway for the creation of generic versions of drugs produced by
biotechnological means. 3 Congress hoped by legalizing the production of generic
biological drugs, generally known as “biosimilars,” that consumer prices for a variety of
important drugs would decrease. 4
Modern biotechnology drugs, or “biologics,” have been a major part of the U.S. drug
market since the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) approved the use of human insulin
in 1982. 5 Biologic drugs are expected to gain an even larger share of the U.S. economy
with time. 6 They already include many of the most commonly used drugs in America,
including four of the top ten most common drugs sold. 7 Approximately 20% of all drugs
on the market in 2009 were biologics. 8
1
Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Heath Care Overhaul Bill, with a Flourish, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy/24health.
html?_r=0.
2
JUDITH JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34045, FDA REGULATION OF FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS
12 (2010), available at http://primaryimmune.org/advocacy_center/pdfs/health_care_reform/
Biosimilars_Congressional_Research_Service_Report.
3
Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets and Patents Under the Biologics
Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 285, 286 (2011).
4
See Letter from Rep. Anna Eshoo et al. to President Barack Obama (Oct. 14, 2011), available at
http://patentdocs.typepad.com/files/house-letter.pdf.
5
See JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 1.
6
Id.
7
Biologic drugs sold under the brand names Humira, Enbrel, Remicade and Neulasta are the third,
seventh, eighth, and ninth most prescribed drugs in the United States, respectively, as of the third quarter of
2013. In addition, the tenth most sold drug, Copaxone, though approved under a New Drug Application per
the FDCA, is a protein-based drug with characteristics strongly similar to biologics. See U.S.
Pharmaceutical Sales: Q4 2013, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/stats/top100/sales (last visited Jan.
29, 2013).
8
WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33901, FOLLOW-ON
BIOLOGICS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION ISSUES 1 (2009), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33901_20090803.pdf.
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However, prices for commonly used biologics are often prohibitive. For instance, the
Crohn’s disease drug Humira—the most commonly sold biologic drug in the United
States 9—costs patients $51,000 on average annually. 10 Other biologics cost even more,
sometimes reaching six figures. 11 Consequently, insurers adopted numerous strategies to
pass costs on to consumers, potentially locking out the less fortunate. 12 It was against this
background that Congress passed the BPCIA.
In 1983, the Hatch-Waxman Act created a pathway to market for generic versions of
traditional small-molecule drugs. 13 Small-molecule drugs, which comprise the majority of
commonly used drugs, are created by purely chemical processes and have relatively simple
structures. As Congress hoped, Hatch-Waxman has had considerable success in lessening
the cost of many pharmaceuticals. For instance, a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) study
found that the entry of multiple generics into the market under the Hatch-Waxman Act
reduced the price of some drugs by up to 80%. 14
But consumers are unlikely to see comparable biosimilar price reductions resulting
from the BPCIA’s enactment for various reasons. 15 First, biologic drugs are inherently
more difficult and costly to manufacture than traditional pharmaceuticals, providing
barriers to entry that the BPCIA cannot effectively address. Second, compared to HatchWaxman, the BPCIA imposes much longer exclusivity periods for both reference drugs
and the first biosimilar produced. This will, at a minimum, delay the cost benefits stemming
from increased competition. Lastly, the interchangeability provisions, which allow for
automatic substitution of reference products similar to generic chemical drugs under HatchWaxman, are much stricter for biologics regulated under the BPCIA.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of both the regulation of biologics in
general and the BPCIA in particular. Although biologic and pharmaceutical drugs have
traditionally been regulated under different statutes, the Hatch-Waxman Act only amended
the statute regulating pharmaceuticals. Consequently, until the passage of the BPCIA, no
pathway existed for approving biosimilars of most biologic drugs.
Part III analyzes the BPCIA’s likely minimal impact on biologic drug prices. There
are numerous structural impediments in the production of biosimilars that do not exist for
generics, of which regulation cannot easily fix. Moreover, specific provisions of the BPCIA
will not only greatly delay market entry, but also reduce the ability of biosimilars to gain
market share relative to generics. Part IV concludes by examining the BPCIA’s potential
impact on future innovation.

Id.
See JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 1.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 2.
13
Id. at 1.
14
FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG COMPETITION
12 (2009) (hereinafter FTC Report), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/emerging-health-care-issuesfollow-biologic-drug-competition-federal-trade-commission-report.
15
See infra Part III for more explanation.
9

10
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II.
A.
¶8

¶9

BACKGROUND

Overview of the History and Regulation of Biologic Drugs

The FDA defines biologic drugs as those derived from biological processes and used
therapeutically to treat diseases. 16 This definition is extraordinarily broad, covering
products ranging from blood components, to toxins like Botox, to viruses altered for use in
gene therapy. 17 Federal regulations differentiate between biologic drugs and chemical
drugs, which are created by synthetic chemical processes. 18 While the latter are regulated
under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), biologic drugs are, for the most part,
licensed for marketing under the Public Health Service Act of 1944 (PHSA). 19 Amended
by the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 to simplify the licensing process, the PHSA now
requires the submission of only a single biologic-license application to market a biologic
product, replacing the two-license system that had been in place. 20 A notable exception to
the general rule that chemical drugs are regulated under the FDCA while biologics are
regulated under the PHSA is the regulation of insulin. 21 Used primarily to treat diabetes,22
insulin is a small protein that, along with glucagon, regulates blood-sugar levels and
carbohydrate metabolism. 23
In 1921, Frederick Banting and Charles Best were the first to isolate insulin,
extracting it from the pancreases of dogs in their lab at the University of Toronto. 24 Shortly
thereafter, the insulin extract was used to treat Leonard Thomson, a 14-year-old boy dying
from type-1 diabetes. 25 Though the initial treatment failed due to insufficient purity, a
subsequent insulin injection was successful, returning the boy to health. 26 For his work in
providing the first effective treatment to a condition that had previously been a death
16
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., WHAT ARE “BIOLOGICS”: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Apr. 14, 2009),
available at http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsand
Tobacco/CBER/ucm133077.htm.
17
See 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2012) (“[Biologics are] a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin,
vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, protein (except any chemically
synthesized polypeptide), or analogous product, or arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine (or any
other trivalent organic arsenic compound), applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or
condition of human beings.”).
18
JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 1.
19
Id. at 5.
20
Id. at 6.
21
Id.
22
Insulin is especially critical for treating individuals suffering from type-1 diabetes. Type 1 diabetes is
an autoimmune disorder affecting the pancreatic islet cells that produce insulin. The beta cells are
destroyed, resulting in lower insulin levels and higher blood sugar. Type-2 diabetes, by contrast, is caused
by insulin resistance; the body still produces insulin at normal levels, but the cells that would normally be
affected by it do so at a reduced level. See Type 1 diabetes, MAYO FOUND. FOR MED. EDUC. AND RESEARCH
(Aug. 2, 2014), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/type-1-diabetes/basics/causes/con20019573.
23
Proteins are large organic molecules composed of amino acids with distinct structure. The protein
insulin is composed of 51 amino acids in two chains, though the specific structure differs somewhat
between species. See Jean-Philippe Cartailler, The Structure of Insulin, BETA CELL BIOLOGY CONSORTIUM,
http://www.betacell.org/content/articleview/article_id/8/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2015).
24
Suzanne White Junod, Celebrating a Milestone: FDA’s Approval of First Genetically Engineered
Product, UPDATE MAG. (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/
ProductRegulation/SelectionsFromFDLIUpdateSeriesonFDAHistory/ucm081964.htm.
25
KALAYYA KRISHNAMURTHY, PIONEERS IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES 266 (Mittal Publ’ns 2002).
26
Michael Bliss, Rewriting History: Charles Best and the Banting and Best Myth, 48 J. HIST. MED.
ALLIED SCI. 253, 254 (1993), available at http://jhmas.oxfordjournals.org/content/48/3/253.full.pdf.
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sentence, Charles Banting received the 1923 Nobel Prize in Medicine along with J.J.R.
Macleod, the director of the lab in which Messrs. Banting and Best worked. 27
¶10
The University of Toronto maintained the patent on insulin until it expired in 1941. 28
During this time, the University of Toronto tested every batch of insulin sold in the United
States to ensure quality. 29 But with the patent’s expiration looming, Congress worried that
without the university’s standardization and oversight the lives of diabetics and other
insulin-dependent patients would be “immediately endangered.” 30 Congress therefore
passed the so-called Insulin Amendments to the FDCA two days before the patent expired,
requiring the FDA to ensure the safety and effectiveness of each batch of insulin sold in
the United States. 31 When Congress passed the PHSA three years later, the FDA retained
its authority to regulate insulin under the FDCA.
¶11
Modern biologic-drug technology has advanced significantly since the days of
animal pancreatic extracts. In 1982, the FDA approved the first modern biotech drug,
human insulin—or “Humulin,” as marketed by Eli Lilly. 32 Rather than rely on purification
of insulin derived from animals, researchers at Genentech—a small biotechnology firm—
used recombinant DNA technology to make a protein identical to insulin produced by the
human pancreas. 33
¶12
Recombinant DNA is made by placing a designed nucleic acid sequence, known as
an “intron,” into a portion of DNA. 34 The portion of DNA is referred to as a “cloning
vector,” and is generally either a plasmid or a DNA-based virus, such as bacteriophage
lambda. 35 One of the key aspects of the cloning vector is that it must be capable of
independently reproducing inside of a host cell, such as an E. coli bacterium. 36 Typically,
the DNA segment is introduced to the vector by first using a “restriction enzyme” to break
apart both the original DNA strand and the introduced strand at a specific point in the
sequence, allowing the two to combine. 37 The enzyme DNA-ligase then seals the strands
together, causing the recombinant DNA to be treated as if it were part of the vector’s DNA
from the start. 38 As a result, the host-cell produces amino acids introduced by the DNA
codes alongside the normally produced amino acids, creating the desired protein in a
process known as “translation.” 39 The cell will produce the protein indefinitely, and the
protein can then be isolated and used as a drug in humans. 40

27
Id. at 253; see also Louis Rosenfeld, Insulin: Discovery and Controversy, 48 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY
2270 (2002) (describing Macleod’s contributions).
28
David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical, Scientific, and Legal Issues Relevant to Designing
Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant Protein-Based Therapeutics and Monoclonal
Antibodies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 143, 153 (2005).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
White Junod, supra note 24.
33
Dudzinski, supra note 28, at 165. Animal insulin is similar, but not identical, to human insulin. Id.
34
JEREMY M BERG, JOHN L TYMOCZKO & LUBERT STRYER, BIOCHEMISTRY § 6.2 (5th ed. 2002),
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK22480/.
35
Id. A Plasmid is a piece of DNA generally found in a bacterial host cell that is capable of independent
replication. Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
See id.
40
Id.
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Following the introduction of human insulin, the FDA approved human growth
hormone in 1985, alpha interferon in 1986, tissue plasminogen activator in 1987, and
erythropoietin in 1989. 41 Today, modern biologics represent four of the ten most
commonly used drugs in the United States by sales. 42 As of 2006, eighteen different biotech
drugs had annual sales of over $1 billion. 43
¶14
Biologic drugs are used to treat a wide array of conditions, including rheumatoid
arthritis, multiple sclerosis, neutropenia, various types of cancer, and diabetes. Due to the
“constructed” nature of drugs produced by biotechnological processes, it is possible to
make blockbuster drugs tailored uniquely to previously unmet medical needs. 44 In time, it
may even be possible to modify a drug for a specific individual. 45 Thus, unlike the
traditional model for pharmacological drugs, which typically targets common conditions
and requires significant marketing expenditures, the model for biologic drugs allows for
adaptability and individualization. 46
¶15
However, biologic drugs are not without flaws. Because biologic drugs are extremely
structurally complex, replication and mass production pose many challenges. 47 The
extreme precision required to produce a biologic drug determines its development. In other
words, “the manufacturing process for each biologic defines . . . the product.” 48 When
combined with regulations requiring FDA approval of manufacturing processes and
facilities—let alone the actual drug—this complexity ensures a significantly more
expensive creation process than is common for traditional chemical drugs. 49 For instance,
estimates place the cost of creating a manufacturing facility for a new biologic drug,
excluding materials, between $200 and $400 million.50 Normally taking ten to fifteen
years, 51 bringing a new biologic to market costs an estimated $1.2 billion.52
¶16
Unsurprisingly, biopharmaceutical firms on average spend roughly 30% of revenue
on research and development (R&D), amongst the highest of any U.S. industry. 53 Some
biopharmaceutical firms—typically those developing a drug for the first time without prior
sales to offset costs—spend more than 100% of revenue on R&D. 54 Further, with roughly
75% of R&D funding spent on plans that ultimately fail and only 5%–10% of the drugs
entering clinical trials receiving approval, most R&D projects provide no remuneration. 55
JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 1.
See supra note 7.
43
Stacy Lawrence, Billion Dollar Babies: Biotech Drugs as Blockbusters, 25 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 380, 380 (2007).
44
See id.
45
Id. at 382.
46
See id. at 380.
47
Kenneth J. Szeto & Marian Wolanski, Initial Steps in the Regulation of Generic Biological Drugs: A
Comparison of US and Canadian Regimes, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 131, 132 (2012).
48
SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 8, at 24 (citing Christopher Webster et al., Biologics: Can There Be
Abbreviated Applications, Generics, or Follow-On Products?, INT’L BIOPHARM MAG. (July 1, 2003),
available at http://www.biopharm-mag.com/biopharm/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=73785).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Erwin A. Blackstone & Joseph P. Fuhr, The Future of Competition in the Biologics Market, 31 TEMP.
J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L 1, 3 (2012).
52
Henry Grabowski, Genia Long & Richard Mortimer, Implementation of the Biosimilar Pathway:
Economic and Policy Issues, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 511, 550 (2011).
53
Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 51, at 3–4.
54
Id.
55
Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 51, at 4.
41
42
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And making matters worse, the FDA has become more cautious than its prior 17%–20%
approval rate in recent years, 56 sometimes even refusing their advisory panel’s
recommendations to grant licensure. 57 Because of these economic hurdles, the majority of
biopharmaceutical firms report negative earnings. 58
¶17
Given the extraordinary costs and risks involved in developing biologics, the FDA’s
increased reluctance to approve new drugs seems perverse. Specifically, these FDAexacerbated barriers to entry disproportionately affect small biopharmaceutical firms,
which are generally far less financially stable than multibillion-dollar corporations like
Merck. 59 Small firms, however, play a critical role in the biopharmaceutical industry. For
instance, from 2006 to 2008, small firms discovered 50% of all new biologics and 56% of
“orphan drugs” developed to treat rare diseases. 60 But without well-funded coffers, these
small firms operate with little margin for error, making the degree of risk exponentially
higher than for established drug makers. This burden, in turn, prompts business mergers to
mitigate risk, thereby reducing competition and limiting the availability of new products
available to consumers. 61 Because of these barriers to entry, biologic drug prices are often
extremely high, 62 with many patients spending tens of thousands of dollars annually. 63
B.

Overview of the Biologic Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2010

1. Licensure & Disclosure
¶18

Congress passed the Biologic Price Competition and Innovation Act as Title VII of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to provide a pathway for the licensure of
follow-on biologic drugs. 64 This pathway is analogous to that provided for generic drugs
by the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, more commonly
referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act. 65 Hatch-Waxman allowed for the filing of
Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs), which have much lower evidentiary
requirements for approval than traditional New Drug Applications used for pioneering drug
research. Because ANDAs require only a showing of equivalency with a given reference
drug rather than independent proof of safety and efficacy, 66 the process of bringing a new
drug to market via an ANDA is consequently much cheaper and less burdensome than
doing so with a traditional New Drug Application. The ANDA process takes only a few
Id.
Id. The authors mention the case of Esbriet, a chemical drug designed to treat idiopathic pulmonary
fibrosis. Though their advisory panel had advised approval and there was a clear medical need for the drug,
the FDA refused approval and demanded a new study in early 2010.
58
Id. at 3–4 (citing Steven Silver, Biotechnology, STANDARD & POOR’S INDUS. SURVEYS (Feb. 24,
2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/49646708/bio-0211).
59
See id. at 5.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Alfred Engelberg, Aaron S. Kesselman & Jerry Avorn, Balancing Innovation, Access and Profits:
Market Exclusivity for Biologics, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1917, 1918 (2009).
63
Id. On the extreme end, imiglucerase, a drug sold under the brand names Cerezyme and Genzyme for
the treatment of Gaucher’s disease, costs roughly $200,000 annually. Id.
64
Stolberg & Pear, supra note 1, at 1.
65
JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 1.
66
Holly Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984: Fine-Tuning the
Balance Between the Interests of Pioneer and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 51, 54
(2003).
56
57
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years and costs $1–$2 million by some estimates, resulting in a continuous influx of
generic-drug manufacturers to the industry. 67
For biologics regulated under the FDCA, Hatch-Waxman’s 1983 enactment similarly
provided a generic pathway via the use of ANDAs. 68 But prior to the BPCIA’s adoption,
there was no direct pathway for approval of follow-on biologics under the PHSA. 69 And
because the PHSA regulates the vast majority of biologics, additional legislation was
needed to form a similar avenue for biologic follow-ons. 70
Congress passed the BPCIA to bring the regulation of biologic follow-ons in line
with that for traditional chemical drugs, albeit more than a quarter century later. The
BPCIA divides follow-on biologics into two categories—interchangeable follow-ons and
biosimilar follow-ons—based on their relationship to an original, pioneering biologic drug,
known as a “reference product” for purposes of the statute. 71 Interchangeable follow-ons
are identical to a reference product and can substitute for a reference product under any
circumstances. 72 Biosimilar follow-ons must both be “highly similar to the reference
product notwithstanding minor differences in chemically inactive components” and have
“no clinically meaningful differences between the biological product and the reference
product in terms of safety, purity, and potency of the product.” 73
To license a product as biosimilar or interchangeable, the application must meet five
criteria. 74 First, the biologic must be substantially similar to the reference product based on
data derived from (1) analytical chemical studies showing the products are “highly
similar,” (2) animal studies including toxicity assessments, and (3) “a clinical study or
studies” sufficient to demonstrate the safety, purity, and potency of the product. 75 The use
of the word “and” without an “or” qualifier suggests that applications must include all three
types of studies. The statute’s description of the purpose behind each study supports this
interpretation. There is, however, some ambiguity surrounding the number of studies
required for each type. The statute states that there may be “a clinical study or studies,” but
only uses the plural “studies” in reference to animal and analytic studies, which, read
together, suggests that the application requires multiple animal and analytic studies to gain
approval. However, regardless of the statue’s text, the elements necessary for an
application’s approval are subject to the FDA’s broad authority. 76
The remaining four criteria are less ambiguous, at least textually. To meet the second
BPCIA requirement, a § 262(k) biologic-license application must show that the
biosimilar’s mechanism of action mirrors that of the reference product. 77 But because these
mechanisms are often initially unknown, the extent of this requirement is limited to only
what is identifiable. The third criterion requires the biosimilar and the reference product to

Henry G. Grabowski, Patents, Innovation, and Access to New Pharmaceuticals, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L.
849, 852 (2002), available at http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/4/849.full.pdf+html.
68
Id. at 8–9.
69
JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 8.
70
Id. at 9.
71
42 U.S.C. § 262 (i)(4) (2012).
72
Id. § 262(i)(3).
73
Id. § 262(i)(2).
74
Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i).
75
Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I).
76
Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(ii).
77
Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(II).
67
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be labeled with the same conditions of use. 78 The fourth requires that the biosimilar’s dose,
route of administration, and strength are the same as that of the reference product. 79 Lastly,
the application must show that the facilities where the biosimilar product is manufactured,
processed, packed, and held meet standards sufficient to assure that the product is safe,
pure, and potent. 80
¶23
In addition, the application may include data indicating that it meets the elevated
requirements for interchangeability. 81 Unlike mere biosimilarity, an interchangeability
designation provides for both an exclusivity period 82 and automatic substitution for the
reference product. 83 This requires not only a showing of biosimilarity, but also that the new
drug can be expected to produce the same clinical result as the reference product. 84
Applicants must also demonstrate that any risks concerning safety or diminished efficacy
are no greater than that of the reference product. 85 Notwithstanding these statutorily
defined steps, the Secretary of Health and Human Services may nevertheless decide to
waive any of the elements normally required for a § 262(k) biosimilar-license application
at any time. 86
¶24
The original reference product receives extensive protection under the BPCIA. For
instance, while § 262(k) applications can be submitted just four years after the approval of
the reference product, 87 applications cannot be approved until a minimum of twelve years
after the licensing of the reference product under § 262(a). 88 These rules do not apply,
however, to licensure for a supplement to the original reference product or to approval of
modifications made by the original manufacturer concerning dosage, route of
administration, strength, or biological structure. 89
¶25
The BPCIA also protects the first interchangeable-biosimilar approved. 90 Under
§ 262(k)(6), no subsequent product may be deemed interchangeable until one of four
possible conditions is met. Namely, if: (1) one year elapses from the first commercial
marketing of the interchangeable; 91 (2) eighteen months pass after the final decision in or
dismissal of a patent infringement suit to prevent marketing of the interchangeable; (3)
forty-two months pass after the initiation of an ongoing patent infringement litigation; 92 or
(4) eighteen months pass after the approval of the first interchangeable, assuming no one
has filed an infringement suit. 93 Crucially, the last condition prevents interchangeable

Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(III).
Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(IV).
80
Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(V).
81
Id. § 262(k)(2)(B).
82
Id. § 262(k)(6).
83
Sara Margolis, Note, Destined for Failure? An Analysis of the Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act of 2009, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 209, 227 (2013).
84
Id. § 262(k)(4)(A).
85
Id. § 262(k)(4)(B).
86
Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(ii).
87
Id. § 262(k)(7)(B).
88
Id. § 262(k)(7)(A).
89
Id. § 262(k)(7)(C). This assumes there is no change to safety, purity, or potency of the reference
product, which only applies if there is a change to the actual structure, not in the former case where the
change is to method of use. Id.
90
Id. § 262(k)(6).
91
Id. § 262(k)(6)(A).
92
Id. § 262(k)(6)(C)(i).
93
Id. § 262(k)(6)(C)(ii).
78
79
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license holders from strategically using their licenses to preclude other companies from
entering the market.
¶26
Yet the majority of biopharmaceutical firms are unlikely to find § 262(k)(6)
particularly useful. Rather than applying to the biosimilar classification, § 262(k)(6)
exclusively applies to interchangeable follow-ons, which experts anticipate will be an
incredibly difficult designation to obtain. 94 For instance, the FDA could require extensive
crossover trials, which often deter patient participation, or limit interchangeability
designations to only those biologics that current technology can be used to demonstrate
sameness. 95 Ultimately, and regardless of the FDA’s eventual process determination, the
likelihood
of
§
262(k)(6)
having
a
significant
impact
seems
slight.
2. Patent Infringement Issues
¶27

As previously alluded to, the BPCIA provides a complicated system for resolving
patent disputes between follow-on and reference-product producers. 96 The first step,
known as the patent-exchange step, requires the biosimilar manufacturer and the referenceproduct manufacturer to share information. 97 After applying for a § 262(k) license, the
applicant must deliver a copy of the application to the reference-product manufacturer, 98
and, in exchange, the reference-product manufacturer must give the applicant a copy of all
relevant patents that might be infringed, referred to as a “Paragraph 3 list.” 99 If the
Paragraph 3 list does not include a relevant patent, the reference-drug manufacturer cannot
later sue for that patent. 100 The applicant then submits a rebuttal Paragraph 3 list of its own
relevant patents, as well as a claim-by-claim analysis of the reference-product
manufacturer’s list wherein the applicant explains how it is not infringing. 101 The last step
of the information exchange requires the reference-product manufacturer to rebut the
applicant’s rebuttal, explaining how the patents at issue are indeed likely to be infringed. 102
¶28
Importantly, this information exchange is a completely private interaction between
the affected parties, subject to strict confidentiality requirements. 103 In contrast, the HatchWaxman Act establishes procedures requiring public disclosure of patents, which, in turn,
are included in the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,
referred to as the “Orange Book.” 104 But because there are no public disclosure
Margolis, supra note 83, at 227.
Id.
96
42 U.S.C. § 262(l).
97
Id. § 262(l)(1).
98
Id. § 262(l)(1)(B)(i); see also Michael P. Dougherty, The New Follow-On-Biologics Law: A Section
by Section Analysis of the Patent Litigation Provisions in the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation
Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 231, 234 (2010).
99
42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3)(A). The name “Paragraph 3 list” is taken from its relevant statutory portion in
subsection (l).
100
Id. § 262(l)(7).
101
Id. § 262(l)(3)(B).
102
Id. § 262(l)(3)(C).
103
Id. § 262(l)(1)(C).
104
21 C.F.R. § 314.53(e) (2009); see Approved Drug Product with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations
(Orange Book), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/
ucm129662.htm (last updated Jan. 22, 2015).
94
95
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requirements for biologic drugs, no equivalent record exists. This distinction is critical.
Unlike traditional generic-drug manufacturers, follow-on biologic manufacturers cannot
determine what patents they might be accidentally infringing in the course of designing
their products. 105
¶29
Following the patent-exchange step, the BPCIA requires a good-faith negotiation
over which patents, if any, will be subject to an action for patent infringement. 106 If the
parties are unable to agree, the “Paragraph 5” patent-resolution provisions trigger. 107 In
that case, the applicant must notify the reference-product manufacturer of the number of
patents it believes might be subject to an infringement suit, thereby setting a ceiling for
how many patents the reference-product manufacturer may list. 108 Within five days of this
submission, both parties provide a Paragraph 5 list detailing the specific patents each
believe may be infringed, 109 thus forming the basis of the infringement suit.
¶30
Only after the patent-exchange and patent-resolution processes end can litigation
begin. 110 The reference-product manufacturer can sue for any relevant patents no more than
thirty days after the parties reach agreement under Paragraph 4, 111 or, if the parties were
unable to agree on a patent list, thirty days after the parties exchanged Paragraph 5 lists.112
Within thirty days of receiving the complaint, the § 262(k) applicant must notify the office
of the Secretary of Health and Human Services and provide a copy of the complaint, 113
which the Secretary uses to publish a relevant notice in the Federal Register. 114 Unlike the
Hatch-Waxman Act, there is no provision for an automatic stay of approval once a patent
litigation is filed. 115
¶31
After this initial litigation process, the applicant must inform the reference-product
manufacturer 180 days prior to when the applicant intends to begin marketing the
product, 116 which allows the reference-product manufacturer to seek a preliminary
injunction. 117 Importantly, because courts must still determine validity, infringement, and
enforcement issues for those patents on the Paragraph 3 list not included on the Paragraph
5 list, 118 this notice provision, in essence, ensures that manufacturers maintain the right to
sue for patents not included on the Paragraph 5 list. 119 Similarly, should the applicant fail
to comply with certain statutory requirements, the reference-product manufacturer may
seek declaratory judgment for any patent on its Paragraph 3 list at any time. 120
Charles Davis, Take Two and Call Congress in the Morning: How the Biologics Price Competition
and Innovation Act May Fail to Prevent Systemic Abuses in the Follow-On Biologic Approval Process, 81
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1282 (2013).
106
42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(4)(A).
107
Id. § 262(l)(4)(B).
108
Id. § 262(l)(5)(A).
109
Id. §§ 262(l)(5)(B)(i)(I)–(II). Much like with Paragraph 3 lists, the term “Paragraph 5 list” is derived
from its place in subsection (l). Id.
110
Id. § 262(l)(6).
111
Id. § 262(l)(6)(A).
112
Id. § 262(l)(6)(B).
113
Id. § 262(l)(6)(C)(i).
114
Id. § 262(l)(6)(C)(ii).
115
Davis, supra note 105, at 1277.
116
Id. § 262(l)(8)(A).
117
Id. § 262(l)(8)(B).
118
Id.
119
Id. § 262(l)(8)(C). Both sides must cooperate with discovery as needed. Id.
120
Id. § 262(l)(9)(B). The BPCIA imposes punishment for noncompliance during the informationexchange process. For example, if the § 262(k) applicant fails to provide its application to the reference105
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III.

FORECASTING THE IMPACT OF THE BPCIA ON BIOLOGIC DRUG PRICES

¶32

Fundamentally, Congress enacted the BPCIA to decrease biologic drugs prices for
consumers without stifling biotech research and innovation. 121 Whether the BPCIA will
fulfill these goals is unknown. It is simply too soon to tell. But perhaps, comparing the
BPCIA to the legislation it was modeled after—the Hatch-Waxman Act—provides some
guidance. Stated simply, the Hatch-Waxman Act has been hugely successful in reducing
the price of drugs. Generally, the first generic to enter the market costs about 25% less than
the branded drug, and after multiple generic drugs enter the market, prices often drop up to
80% from their peak. Because of these decreased prices, more Americans in need have
access to beneficial medication. As a result, generic drugs now represent roughly 70% of
total pharmaceutical prescriptions. 122 Thus at first blush, it is unsurprising that Congress
modeled the BPCIA after the Hatch-Waxman Act.
¶33
But the BPCIA is unlikely to meet these high expectations. Compared to the HatchWaxman Act, various obstacles stand in the way of the BPCIA similarly reducing drug
prices. First, biologics are inherently more expensive to manufacture, increasing barriers
to entry and thus reducing competition and its corresponding impact on drug prices.
Second, the BPCIA imposes long exclusivity periods for both the reference drug and the
first interchangeable biosimilar, again hindering new firms from competing effectively.
Lastly, the BPCIA’s interchangeability standards allowing for automatic substitution, the
primary driver of price reductions, are difficult to meet.
A.

Biosimilar Drugs Are Significantly More Expensive to Develop
Than Chemical Generics

¶34

Biopharmaceuticals are inherently more costly to develop than chemical drugs.
Further, they are difficult to manufacture in quantity, require precise manufacturing
processes, and involve exorbitant start-up costs, such as the estimated $200 to $400 million
required just to build the initial manufacturing plant. 123As a result, the production of a new
biologic drug generally requires an investment of approximately $1.2 billion. 124 In other
words, developing a new biopharmaceutical drug costs double the estimated $802 million
required to develop a new chemical drug. 125
¶35
This cost difference is even greater when comparing biosimilars to generics. For
instance, in Europe the cost of bringing a biosimilar to market ranges from $75 to $250
million,126 and requires between eight and ten years to develop. 127 On the other hand,

product manufacturer upon completion, it may be sued for declaratory judgment of infringement at any
time for any patent. Id. § 262(l)(9)(C).
121
See Epstein, supra note 3, at 286.
122
Id. at 223.
123
See SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 8, at 21–22.
124
Grabowski et al., supra note 52.
125
SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 8, at 22.
126
Mark McCamish & Gillian Woollett, Worldwide Experience with Biosimilar Development, 3 MABS
209, 211 (2011), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3092622/pdf/
mabs0302_0209.pdf.
127
Sumanth Kambhammettu, The European Biosimilars Market: Trends and Key Success Factors,
SCICASTS (Oct. 27, 2008), http://scicasts.com/specialreports/20-biopharmaceuticals/2152-the-europeanbiosimilars-market-trends-and-key-success-factors.
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standard chemical-drug generics require only a few years and $1 to $2 million to develop,
a mere fraction of its biologic counterpart. 128
¶36
There are two primary reasons for these high manufacturing costs: scientific
challenges specific to biologic production and more burdensome data requirements. First,
it is simply more difficult to make the sort of large molecules characteristic of biologic
drugs. Virtually every aspect of production must be meticulously controlled and monitored
to generate a useable product, 129 with even minor temperature changes potentially ruining
an entire batch of biopharmaceuticals. 130 The medium of production and storage conditions
are also essential to the final product. 131 Impurities can arise from nearly any change in the
manufacturing process, 132 and because this process takes more time than that for chemical
drugs, sometimes lasting up to nine months per batch, the likelihood of an impurity
corrupting the batch increases. 133 All of this is without accounting for the costs of materials,
which are often 20 to 100 times more expensive than for conventional chemical drugs. 134
Perhaps the biggest obstacle, however, is the cost of building, equipping, and qualifying
the manufacturing plant, which generally costs between $250 million and $1 billion.135
¶37
On top of the arduous manufacturing process, biosimilars will likely face additional
data requirements relative to generics. Hatch-Waxman provides very specific data
standards ANDAs must meet to show bioequivalence, which often suffice to gain FDA
approval if met. 136 The BPCIA, by contrast, only states that the FDA shall require analytic,
animal, and clinical studies, and provides no further guidance detailing what sort of
similarity applicants must show. 137 Most likely, and lasting for the indefinite future, the
FDA will determine this amorphous similarity requirement on a case-by-case basis, relying
only on the relative state of knowledge about the reference product in question. 138
¶38
Given the immense costs associated with entering the biosimilar market, it is likely
that only well-established companies with substantial extant resources will be able to do
so at all. 139 Even then, as indicated by the FTC, it will likely only be for drugs with annual
sales greater than $250 million.140 Consequently, only the most profitable biologics are
likely to face biosimilar competition. In the end, because niche markets and less profitable
drugs are unlikely to spur the same degree of competition, high prices will remain the norm
for biologics generally.

Grabowski, supra note 67, at 852.
See, e.g., Jordan Paradise, The Devil Is in the Details: Health-Care Reform, Biosimilars, and
Implementation Challenges for the Food and Drug Administration, 51 JURIMETRICS J. 279, 281 (2011).
130
See id.
131
Id.
132
SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 8, at 24.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
FTC Report, supra note 14, at 14.
136
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2012) (“The Secretary may not require that an abbreviated application
contain information in addition to that required by clauses (i) through (viii).”).
137
See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i); see also Grabowski et al., supra note 52, at 518–19.
138
Grabowski et al., supra note 52, at 519.
139
FTC Report, supra note 14, at 15.
140
Id.
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B.

The BPCIA’s Long Exclusivity Periods Will Hamper the
Emergence of Multiple Biosimilars

¶39

The BPCIA creates separate exclusivity periods for both the reference product and
the first interchangeable-biosimilar approved. 141 The reference drug receives a firm twelveyear exclusivity period before the first biosimilar can be approved, including four years of
data exclusivity in which § 262(k) biosimilar applications cannot be filed. 142 The first
interchangeable, by contrast, receives an exclusivity period ranging from twelve to fortytwo months, depending on the litigation process and marketing strategy employed. 143
Regardless, both impose much higher barriers to entry for new biosimilars than anything
found under the Hatch-Waxman Act.144 For example, the Hatch-Waxman Act affords a
five-year exclusivity period for new chemical drugs and a three-year exclusivity period for
new chemical investigations (NCIs) of small-molecule drugs. 145 Those supporting the
longer exclusivity period for biologics relative to chemical drugs argue that the high costs
of producing biologics require greater incentives for innovation, thus justifying the more
restrictive exclusivity provisions. 146 Regardless of the reasoning behind these provisions,
longer exclusivity periods naturally cause prices to remain higher for longer, further
detracting from the BPCIA’s professed goals.
¶40
The interchangeable exclusivity period also conflicts with its Hatch-Waxman Act
counterpart. For a variety of reasons, however, the BPCIA’s exclusivity period might
actually provide a better catalyst for competition, hastening the entry of additional drugs
to the market. Hatch-Waxman only provides exclusivity for a period of 180 days following
an applicant’s first commercial marketing efforts of the generic drug. 147 A first applicant
is defined (somewhat obscurely) as “an applicant that, on the first day on which a
substantially complete application . . . is submitted [to the FDA] for approval of a drug,
submits a substantially complete application.” 148 In other words, the first person to
complete an ANDA gets 180 days of exclusivity dating from when she first begins
marketing.
¶41
Though the Hatch-Waxman exclusivity period lasts only half as long as even the
shortest potential exclusivity period under the BPCIA, initial loopholes allowed first
applicants to game the system by preventing additional generics from entering the
market. 149 Notably, Hatch-Waxman contained no tolling provision on the exclusivity
period, extending 180 days after first marketing, regardless of when that actually occurred.
42 U.S.C. §§ 262(k)(6)–(7).
Id. § 262(k)(7).
143
Id. § 262(k)(6).
144
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv). Hatch-Waxman establishes market exclusivity until 180 days after first
commercial marketing of the first generic. There are also a number of forfeiture events specified in 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i) that result in loss of the exclusivity period. These forfeiture events primarily
revolve around a variety of ways generic manufacturers could potentially prevent the exclusivity period
from tolling, thus preventing any generics from entering the market. The forfeiture events were added by an
amendment in 2003 in response to then-rampant abuse of the Hatch-Waxman system. Id.
145
FTC Report, supra note 14, at 27.
146
Id. at 25.
147
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).
148
Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb).
149
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). The Eleventh Circuit
upheld an agreement between a pioneer manufacturer and the manufacturer of the first generic whereby the
generic manufacturer agreed not to enter the market for a set period of time in exchange for a large
payment from the pioneer manufacturer. Id.
141
142
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Though the FDA initially required that generic-drug applicants defend a patent
infringement claim successfully to be eligible for the 180-day exclusivity period, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia in Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala
rejected this interpretation as plainly contrary to the statute as written. 150
¶42
Subsequently, the FDA began implementing the exclusivity provisions purely on a
first-to-file basis, regardless of any other considerations. 151 If the first applicant chose not
to begin marketing, the 180-day exclusivity period never commenced, thus barring
approval of any subsequent generics indefinitely. 152 Because of this clear congressional
oversight, first applicants began entering into settlements with pioneer drug companies
whereby they agreed to refrain from entering the market in exchange for payments from
the pioneer company. 153 Fortunately, Congress responded to these blatantly
anticompetitive agreements by amending Hatch-Waxman to add a number of forfeiture
events, which end the exclusivity period if triggered, thus deterring parties from entering
into these arrangements. 154
¶43
The Hatch-Waxman loophole taught Congress a valuable lesson. Under the BPCIA,
this type of anticompetitive behavior is impossible. For instance, should the first
interchangeable choose to accept a payment in exchange for not entering the market, the
exclusivity period simply runs for eighteen months before terminating. 155 While
technically a party can block other biosimilars from entering the market for up to forty-two
months, this requires there to be ongoing patent litigation, which inherently precludes the
sort of reverse payments seen in the original Hatch-Waxman schemes. 156 Taking into
account the exponentially higher costs biosimilar producers need to offset, Congress
clearly learned from the mistakes it made when drafting Hatch-Waxman, thus providing a
significantly superior interchangeable exclusivity period under the BPCIA.
C.
¶44

Interchangeability Is Unlikely to Be Utilized by the Majority of Biosimilars

The FDA will approve an interchangeable designation if an applicant can show that,
compared to the reference drug, the biosimilar will have the same clinical result in every
patient and that it is as safe and efficacious. 157 This is, naturally, a more difficult
classification to obtain than mere biosimilarity. 158 And while no formal regulations have
yet been adopted, the FDA released draft guidance for biosimilarity determinations in
February 2012. 159 The FDA’s draft guidance recommends a stepwise methodology
whereby a potential biosimilar must pass a series of tests to demonstrate biosimilarity,

955 F. Supp. 128, 131 (D.D.C. 1997), aff’d, 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the Hatch-Waxman Scheme on Orange Book
Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 195 (2005).
152
Id. at 196.
153
Id. at 197.
154
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)–(ii).
155
42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6)(C)(ii).
156
Id. § 262(k)(6)(C)(i).
157
Id. § 262(k)(4).
158
Margolis, supra note 83, at 227.
159
FDA Issues Draft Guidance on Biosimilar Product Development, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 9,
2012), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm291232.htm.
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151
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which the FDA will evaluate through applying a risk-based, totality-of-the-evidence
approach. 160
But the standards for determining interchangeability are entirely unknown. The FDA
has yet to issue even draft guidance regarding what will be required to determine that a
biosimilar is interchangeable, but, judging from the FDA’s own proclamations, the
standards will likely be rigorous. 161 For instance, the FDA may well require biosimilars to
show “sameness” with the reference product under available tests to qualify as
interchangeable. 162 Alternatively, the FDA could mandate crossover trials, which require
patients to switch between the reference product and the biosimilar during the course of a
clinical trial. 163 These trials, however, are notoriously burdensome, causing many patients
to refuse enrollment. 164
Moreover, the experiences of other countries with analogous biosimilarinterchangeable regulatory systems further indicate that those seeking interchangeable
approval are likely facing an uphill battle. In the European Union, for example, the
European Medicines Agency (EMA), serving in a role comparable to that of the FDA, has
approved biosimilars of three different categories of biologic drugs, with three more likely
to follow. 165 However, as of 2012, the EMA has not approved a single interchangeable. 166
The difficulty of obtaining interchangeable status is “likely to dampen how quickly
a [follow-on biologic] manufacturer gains market share compared to generic drug
entry.” 167 In the traditional chemical-drug market, generic status normally results in
automatic substitution by pharmacists without physician approval, allowing the generic to
garner market share quickly at the brand-name drug’s expense. 168 And as more generic
drugs enter the market, the brand-name drug’s market share continues to shrink, prompting
further competition, all of which ultimately culminates in drastically lower prices for the
consumer. 169 Each element of this chain of events is essential for reduced drug costs.
Biosimilars, however, need to qualify as interchangeable to get automatic
substitution. 170 Dramatic price reductions become far less likely without automatic
160
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING BIOSIMILARITY TO A
REFERENCE PRODUCT 7–8 (2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM291128.pdf. The FDA specifically proposes beginning with an
extensive structural and functional characterization of the proposed biosimilar and the reference product to
determine what other studies are needed and any potentially important structural differences between the
two products. Id. From there, the FDA recommends using animal testing to determine toxicity, followed by
human testing. The totality-of-the-evidence approach is used afterwards to allow for approval in a case
where the product is shown to have some differences from the reference product that are clinically
insignificant. Id.
161
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BIOSIMILARS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION AND INNOVATION ACT OF 2009 11–12 (2012), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM27300
1.pdf (stating that the FDA is continuing to consider the information that will enable a determination of
interchangeability). The FDA also notes that it would be “difficult as a scientific matter” to prove
interchangeability given the statutory standards. Id.
162
Grabowski et al., supra note 52, at 519.
163
Id. at 524.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 520–21.
166
Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 51, at 3.
167
FTC Report, supra note 14, at 16.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
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substitution. Because obtaining interchangeable status poses such difficulties, biosimilar
manufacturers will have the additional burden of convincing physicians to prescribe the
biosimilar in place of the reference drug, requiring significant marketing expenditures.171
Even with marketing, however, lingering uncertainties about differences between the
biosimilar and the reference product will likely hamper sales, at least initially. 172 Coupled
with the fear of patients reacting differently to the biosimilar, few incentives exist for
physicians to prescribe a new drug simply because it is cheaper. 173
¶49
Overall, commentators estimate follow-on biologics will achieve a 10%–30% market
174
share. Though this will likely decrease biologic drug prices, these slight cost reductions
will pale in comparison to those resulting from traditional generic-drug market entry, which
generally capture 80% of the market after introduction. 175 Europe’s experience again
supports these predictions, where biosimilars have caused prices to decrease in the range
of only 25%–30%. 176
IV. CONCLUSION
¶50

For structural and legislative reasons, the BPCIA will likely fail to facilitate
biosimilar market entry. 177 However, with respect to the long-term health of the
biopharmaceutical industry, this failure may in fact be a blessing. Biotechnology remains
one of the riskiest business ventures in the United States, with more than 90% of projects
failing before reaching the market. 178 Even for the few biologics that do eventually make
it to market, the task of recouping expenses remains daunting: a successful biologic
typically requires a roughly $1.2 billion investment over the course of 10–15 years. 179 If
society wishes to see further investment in new and innovative biologic drugs, perhaps the
most important factor is to ensure a sufficiently long period of market exclusivity, allowing
companies to, at the very least, recoup expenditures. 180 Encouraging further biologic
innovation thus seems prima facie incompatible with rapid biosimilar market entry.

Margolis, supra note 83, at 228.
FTC Report, supra note 14, at 16–17.
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Id.
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Id. at 19.
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Thomas Philipson, Don’t Be Fooled: Brand Drugs Cut Prices More than Generics, FORBES (Feb. 3,
2014, 7:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomasphilipson/2014/02/03/dont-be-fooled-brand-drugs-cutprices-more-than-generics/.
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See supra Part III.
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